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Mr K and Mr U Sign Friendship Pact

The Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic signed a pact of friendship and mutual assistance in Moscow on June 12th. The pact, valid for twenty years, was signed by Premier Nikita Khrushchov for the USSR, and by Walter Ulbricht, Chairman of the State Council, for the GDR.

The main clauses of the treaty stipulated:

1. The present close cooperation between the two states shall be continued and expanded.

2. The two states will give each other immediate support in case of military attack; at the same time they will work in every way for peace and an end of the arms race.

3. Both states declare that they regard the frontiers produced in Europe by World War Two as unalterable.

A joint communique which accompanied the treaty stressed that the conclusion of the friendship pact was not in any way a substitute for the peace treaty with Germany, which was necessary to dispose of the remnants of World War Two, such as the West Berlin problem. Three clauses of the treaty made special mention of the unsettled nature of the German problem as a whole, specifying that the western powers still had special duties under the Potsdam Agreement with regard to West Germany; that the treaty partners "regard West Berlin as a separate political entity"; and that German unity can only be achieved by negotiations between the two existing German states.

The Friendship Pact was signed at the conclusion of a two-week visit to the Soviet Union by a large GDR delegation headed by Chairman Walter Ulbricht. Apart from the Friendship Pact, important agreements were reached between the two sides on a considerable increase in economic cooperation. The German Democratic Republic is today the most important foreign trade partner of the Soviet Union, and vice versa. This cooperation will be stepped up still further in future, particularly in the field of chemicals and minerals; the GDR will supply the Soviet Union with complete factories for chemical production, for instance, while the Soviet Union will help the GDR to locate and raise oil and gas both under the GDR proper and under the continental shelf in the Baltic.

(Extracts from the joint communique issued in Moscow at the conclusion of the visit are given below; a summary of the terms of the Friendship Treaty is printed on page 99.)

Moscow Communique — Main Points

The joint communique published in Moscow and Berlin on June 14th covered a wide field of political, economic and ideological questions. Here are some of the main points:

1. The German Question

The German question can only be settled on the basis acceptance of the real facts in the world at large and on German soil. This means:

a. Recognition of the existing sovereign German states — the German Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic. The voluntary and equal cooperation of these two states is the only way to achieve a united, peace-loving and democratic Germany.

b. Legal demarcation of the existing frontiers of the German states.

c. Normalisation of the relation to the two German states, and between them, on the basis of peaceful coexistence and cooperation.

What is necessary is nothing more nor less than the stabilisation of the existing situation, which would entail no sacrifice or loss for any state. On the contrary, all states would win that which is most important: stabilisation of peace, reduction of tension, and release from the burdens of the arms race.

It would also help to normalise the international situation if both German states were accepted as members of the United Nations. This would be in accordance with the principle of universality of the United Nations, and would help to do away with the unworthy discrimination (against the GDR) still practiced by some western states.

A realistic approach to the question of recognition of the two existing German states, and the establishment of normal diplomatic relations, would help to clear the air, and aid in the solution of such urgent problems as the arms race, the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, etc.

2. West Berlin and a Peace Treaty

The GDR und the USSR believe that it is urgently necessary to press ahead with the disposal of remnants of the Second World War, to conclude a German peace treaty, and on this basis to convert West Berlin into a demilitarised free city. Since West Berlin lies in the centre of the GDR, and upon its territory, the readiness

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of the Government of the GDR to consent to the conversion of West Berlin into a demilitarised free city is an important concession, and a further proof of the peace policy of the GDR.

Both sides are convinced that under the present conditions the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany would be a turning point in the international situation. When a German peace settlement has become reality, and the situation of West Berlin has been normalised on this basis, the source of particularly dangerous tensions will have been removed, a source which causes the strongest powers to range their forces one against the other.

Both sides must draw attention to the fact that ruling circles in the German Federal Republic are strengthening their provocative activities in West Berlin. The revanchist manipulations of the German Federal Republic in West Berlin, undertaken with the knowledge and compliance of the occupation authorities of the three western powers, could well create serious complications in central Europe.

West Berlin has never formed part of the German Federal Republic, and will never form part of it. The German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union regard West Berlin as an independent political entity, and this has been laid down in the Friendship Pact.

3. West German Revanchism

World peace is particularly endangered by the political course pursued by the West German revanchists and militarists, who aim at a revision of the results of the Second World War, and the recreation of the imperialist German Reich. The German Federal Republic is the only country in Europe which lays official claim to the territory of other states. The militarist circles of the German Federal Republic are attempting to drag the NATO states into their revanchist adventure. West German imperialism, with its important military and economic potential, has created the largest army in western Europe, and is persistently trying to equip the Bundeswehr with nuclear weapons, under the camouflage of the multilateral force. To implement its plans of revenge, West German imperialism is ready to expose humanity to the acute danger of nuclear disaster.

The western powers, and in particular the USA, bear a serious share of responsibility by favouring, through their policies, West German militarism and revanchism.

The GDR and the USSR declare that the creation of a NATO nuclear force, giving West German militarism access to weapons of mass destruction would be a serious threat to peace, and could lead to an unlimited spreading of nuclear weapons to other states. The USSR, the GDR and the other Warsaw Pact states would then be forced to take the necessary measures to guarantee their security.

Both sides believe that in view of the dangerous degree of war preparedness in West Germany, a reduction in the size and armament of the Bundeswehr and an effective international control of war production in the German Federal Republic would be in the interests of European security. Since a peace treaty has not yet been signed, these measures should be taken in accordance with the stipulations of the unconditional capitulation of Germany and of the Potsdam Agreement.

4. Economic Questions

The GDR and the USSR will endeavour in every way to further the part played by the Council for Mutual Economic Aid (Comecon) in developing the economic relations between the socialist countries, and furthering the international socialist division of labour and specialisation, to the advantage of each socialist country and the socialist family of nations.

Concrete problems were discussed in connection with the co-ordination of the economic plans of the GDR and the USSR for the years 1966 to 1970. The volume of trade between the GDR and the USSR is steadily growing, and will reach about 11,200 million marks (nearly £ 1000 million) this year. As a result of the discussions methods were discovered for a further important increase in trade during the coming five-year period.

For the speedier development of the chemical industry, the GDR and the Soviet Union will aid each other in the coming years. Between 1966 and 1970 the GDR will supply the Soviet Union with complete chemical factories.

The Soviet Union will give the GDR technical aid in expanding the East Foundry Combine, and in constructing two large thermal power works. On the request of the German partners, the Soviet Union will provide complete boring rigs and the necessary specialists for further search for oil and gas.

5. Ideological Questions

The representatives of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union discussed the present situation in the international communist and workers' movement, and noted complete agreement on all questions discussed. The two parties regard it as their highest international duty to strengthen the unity of the world communist movement. The two parties condemn strongly the splitting activities of the leadership of the Communist Party of China... The leaders of the Communist Party of China have basically broken with the general line of the world communist movement, and are sliding into a petit bourgeois and nationalist position. The Socialist Unity Party of Germany and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union will not relax their efforts to guard Marxist teachings against left and right opportunism, and to consolidate the world communist movement on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and the programmes of action agreed by the fraternal parties in 1957 and 1960.

6. International Affairs

Both sides re-affirm their complete solidarity with the peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America in their struggle for national independence, social progress and the right to conduct their lives without outside interference.

They welcome the victory of the Algerian people and wish them success in building up socialism.

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Soviet – GDR Friendship Pact

A Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Co-operation was signed in Moscow on June 12th 1964 between the German Democratic Republic and the USSR. Here are the main points of the treaty:

Preamble

The preamble states that the aims of the treaty are to strengthen friendship between the two countries and further the policies of peace and co-existence. In accordance with the 1955 Warsaw Pact, the treaty partners will resist any revision of the results of World War Two and defend each other's territorial integrity. The partners agree that the GDR has fulfilled the terms of the Potsdam Agreement, is pursuing a peace policy and is an important factor for peace in Europe.

"Desiring to facilitate signature of a German peace treaty and to achieve German unity on a peaceful and democratic foundation, and guided by the aims and principles of the UN Charter, the contracting partners have agreed upon the following:"

Article 1

Further development of existing friendship and co-operation, on the basis of complete equality, mutual respect for sovereignty, non-interference in each other's internal affairs and observance of the principles of socialist internationalism and brotherly aid.

Article 2

Continued efforts to get rid of the remnants of World War Two, to achieve a German peace treaty and to normalise the situation in West Berlin. "Both sides take the view that until a peace treaty is concluded the USA, Great Britain and France continue to bear responsibility for enforcing in the Federal Republic the demands and pledges on uprooting German militarism and Nazism and preventing German aggression which were undertaken jointly by the governments of the Four Powers in the Potsdam and other international agreements."

Article 3

The treaty partners will do their utmost to maintain peace and security in Europe and the world, in accordance with the UN Charter. They will take all measures in their power to further a settlement of such fundamental international problems as general and total disarmament, including partial measures contributing to an arms race stop and a lessening of international tension, an end to colonialism and a settlement by peaceful means of territorial and frontier disputes.

Article 4

The treaty partners solemnly declare that the inviolability of the GDR's state frontiers is a basic factor in European security and reaffirm their joint determination to maintain these frontiers. They will take all necessary measures to prevent militarist and revanchist aggression aiming at revision of the results of World War Two.

Article 5

In case of an armed attack by any country or group of countries against either of the treaty partners, the other partner will give immediate assistance under the terms of the Warsaw Pact. The UN Security Council will be informed of any such measures taken. Measures will cease immediately upon suitable action by the UN Security Council to restore peace and security.

Article 6

Referring to West Berlin, the treaty states: "West Berlin will be regarded by the contracting parties as an independent political entity."

Article 7

Both sides re-affirm their view that "in view of the existence of two sovereign German states, a peaceful, democratic, united Germany can only be achieved through negotiations and understanding – on a parity basis – between these two sovereign states."

Article 8

Economic and scientific-technical co-operation between the treaty partners are to be developed to the fullest possible extent; cultural, social, travel and sports contacts will also be further developed.

Article 9

This treaty does not impinge upon the rights and duties of both sides arising out of valid bilateral and other international agreements, including the Potsdam Agreement.

Article 10

The treaty will remain in force for twenty years from the date of ratification, and for a further ten years if not cancelled.

In the event that a united, democratic and peaceloving German state is set up or a German peace treaty signed, this treaty can, at the request of either contracting party, be re-considered before the date of expiry.

Article 11

The treaty is subject to ratification and enters into force with the exchange of ratification documents, which will take place shortly in Berlin.

Both parties condemn Portuguese colonial policy in Africa. They urge that, in the interests of peace and security in Laos, the Geneva Agreement of 1962 be strictly adhered to. They reiterate their support for the people of South Vietnam in their difficult struggle for independence against a corrupt clique held in power by US military aid. They declare their support for the people of Cyprus in their efforts to conduct their internal affairs without foreign intervention, and for the Korean people's demand that US troops be withdrawn from South Korea and their country re-united on a peaceloving and democratic basis.

The GDR and the Soviet Union urge that the declaration of the UN General Assembly on granting independence to all colonial countries and peoples be put into practice without delay. Both sides insist that interference by imperialist powers in the affairs of other countries should cease.

They condemn the neo-colonialist aspirations of the West German government, which is exploiting the urgent needs of the emergent countries to try to interfere in their internal affairs and force unfavourable conditions upon them. By means of military agreements with these countries, the West German imperialist are trying to expand their spheres of influence in Africa and elsewhere.

Both sides express the hope that the World Conference on Trade and Development now being held will contribute to removing all artificial barriers and discrimination in international trade and lead to an expansion of trade on a basis of equality and mutual advantage.

NEW SCHOOLS FOR NEW TIMES (1)

By Joan Becker

In the coming months parents, educationists and others interested in education in the GDR will be discussing details of a new Education Law, a draft of which was published in May.

The new Education Law, after amendments and improvements which will emerge from the public discussion, is expected to come into force towards the end of the year.

The new law will take into account various weaknesses which have become apparent since the last big revision of the school programme in 1959 and tackle many new problems in general and higher education which have arisen from the changing times. Some of the main problems are how to provide children with enough of the vastly increasing sum total of human knowledge without overloading time-tables or lengthening basic education beyond its present ten-year span; the relative importance to be attached to the humanities and the natural sciences; and how to equip young people adequately to cope with the advances in science and technology.

When this new Education Law comes into force it will mark the third stage in the very rapid development of education in the GDR since 1945, when reconstruction had to begin from the ground up.

In this article I should like to sketch developments since 1945; a further article will examine the main features of the new draft law.

The schools had been a nazi stronghold under Hitler. Of the 37,000 teachers remaining in the eastern part of Germany when the war ended 22,000 were dismissed because of their membership of the Nazi Party. 43,000 new teachers — tried anti-fascist veterans and young people of good will — were installed after a brief emergency training; nazi textbooks were pulped and new standard textbooks with a democratic content introduced for use in all schools. Discrepancies between education in town and countryside were abolished as quickly as possible and a new unitary system of education set up which provided children everywhere with eight years' standard primary education free of charge. A start was also made in working out standard two or three-year vocational training courses to follow primary school.

All the old dwarf or one-class schools (where one teacher taught children of all ages between 6 and 14 in one class-room) were abolished, and central schools set up at strategic points; school buses brought in children from outlying villages. Enormous quantities of textbooks and teaching aids were produced and tens of thousands more teachers trained. *(The West German authorities are only now beginning to deal with the problem of one-class schools. According to the West German liberal weekly "Die Zeit", May 15th 1964, the number of one-class schools in West Germany actually doubled in the past ten years; in Bavaria, for example, there had been 600 of them in 1945 and there were 2,200 in 1958. Hessen province alone, under its Social Democratic Prime Minister, has recently begun to deal with the problem by setting up central schools similar to those established in the GDR more than ten years ago).*

By 1955 this process of providing adequate education for all was completed, and the second stage could begin.

It was now clear that the emphasis would have to shift somewhat away from mere book-learning, both in primary and higher education, and also that education would have to provide more knowledge for all, especially in the natural sciences, in order to keep abreast of technical and scientific developments.

Experiments began in polytechnical education — linking up normal schools lessons with training in practical skills. Smaller children, for example, learned woodwork, gardening etc., and a "day in production" was introduced for 13 and 14 year-olds, with the idea of preparing them better for their future life and work. In an effort to link up natural science teaching in school with its practical applications in industry and agriculture, groups of children were taken to visit selected enterprises, the 13 and 14 years-olds took metalwork and other courses in factories, and the "Landschulheim" (country home school — a progressive educational idea of the 1920's) was revived; whole school classes spent two or three weeks with their teachers in these schools during the summer months, taking ordinary lessons in the morning and helping with simpler farm work in the afternoons. A new school subject, "Introduction to Socialist Production", was added to the time-table in the last year of primary school.

Vocational school teachers and factory workers helped the school staffs to work out syllabuses for this new kind of polytechnical education.

The results soon showed that the principles behind all these changes were correct. But time-tables became seriously over-loaded; six lessons a day were considered the maximum for average school children, but the fact that 13 and 14 year-olds were now spending one day a week doing practical work meant that the subjects regarded as less essential — music, drawing, English and even gymnastics — tended to be relegated to the afternoon, when children were already tired.

The whole system appeared at first extremely unwieldy. Many teachers and parents did not at once take kindly to the idea of polytechnical education, especially since there were difficulties in providing proper facilities und useful, non-dangerous work on the land and in factories for children of 13 and 14. Some parents who intended their children to take up "academic" careers did not see the need for all this practical education, either.

At that time it required considerable vision to anticipate what would eventually develop as a result of these experiments, and when the draft of the law introducing ten years' compulsory education including polytechnical training was introduced in 1959, it was hotly discussed for nearly a year before it was passed in December of that year. Many working class parents, too, who approved of polytechnical training as such, took some time to get used to the idea of waiting two years longer for their children to start earning.

In accordance with this law, the "ten-year general polytechnical high school" for children from 6 to 16 was to be the main basis for further education and training. There were, of course, still to be a certain number of twelve-year high schools (pupils not to exceed 30 per cent of the total number of children at school), which were called "extended twelve-year polytechnical high schools" and provided four-year courses from

the age of 14 to 18 ending in "Abitur" (about the equivalent of British GCE – A level) as hitherto, but with the addition of a certain amount of polytechnical training. Graduates of these schools were in general required to do a year's practical work before entering university, although this principle was not rigidly applied.

One of the biggest difficulties in carrying out the provisions of this law was to provide enough adequately trained teachers. Tremendous efforts were made; thousands of primary school teachers took correspondence courses to step up their qualifications and tens of thousands of new teachers were trained, so that by 1963 there were nearly 165,000 teachers in the GDR. Accomodation and staff for ten years' education for all are in fact available now (although there will continue to be a very small proportion of children who cannot well take advantage of the final two years).

During the past five years big efforts have made to systematise polytechnical training so that all children should be receiving standard vocational training in some important branch of industry or agriculture (there are now possibilities to train in 111 vocations); special courses were also arranged for mentally and physically handicapped children. There are, of course, still considerable difficulties in combining children's natural bents with the requirements of economic planning and training facilities available.

For the past year or so experiments have been going on with selected groups in extended high schools as a result of which children will be able to complete full vocational training in the same year as they take their "Abitur". Graduates of ten-year high schools, too, can now take extended high school courses ending in "Abitur" alongside their three-year vocational training courses in selected vocational training schools attached to big enterprises.

The lines along which the quantitative problems can be solved have thus been laid down. The new draft law published in May is concerned mainly with the contents and quality and better organisation of general education needed to keep pace with advancing science and technology.

(This is the first of a series of three articles)

The German Dialogue

The GDR authorities recently suggested that an exchange of newspapers should be arranged between the two German states to give people in both parts of Germany more first-hand information about developments and trends. The West German authorities have hitherto refused to cooperate, claiming that West German laws make it impossible for GDR newspapers to be circulated there.

In the meantime, "Neues Deutschland", East Berlin organ of the Socialist Unity Party, initiated an exchange of articles between leading newspapers in the two states. Below we reprint the first fruits of this exchange, an article written for "Die Zeit", liberal Hamburg weekly, and a reply, written for "Neues Deutschland", East Berlin daily. Both these articles were printed in full in both newspapers.

The Permanent Expedients

By Theo Sommer ("Die Zeit", Hamburg)

After ten days in the territory of the German communists it is difficult to deny that it is a reality, however much we may object to it. The GDR exists, with or without inverted commas, and it will continue to exist. The system can never function so well that the people will really be happy; neither will it ever again function so badly that the people are forced to rise up against it in pure despair. Not that I think the GDR is Germany's future, as Ulbricht's propagandists proclaim on their posters. But I do have the feeling that the two permanent expedients – the Federal Republic here and the German Democratic Republic over there – will remain with Germany for a long time to come.

We shall have to wait a long time for reunification. It can neither be won through military action nor bought through diplomatic action. We should no longer think of reunification as something which will result from international action or actions but, at the best, as the end result of a lengthy political and social process of development. It may be necessary, by means of repeated legal reminders, to prevent our claim to reunification from "superannuating", whatever that may mean in hard fact; but it would be more useful to encourage this process of development with all the means at our disposal.

What we need is a sensible interim policy. It must help to release forces in the GDR which can help to make the state of division more bearable so long as reunification remains a distant hope. It must loosen up the status quo, since this cannot be overcome by a frontal attack. Such an interim policy needs confidence, patience and imagination; it must aim to bring about changes through stronger links between West and East Germany, through contacts, exchange of newspapers, credits, travel passes and visits. It must not renounce what is possible simply because it is only capable of aiming at the impossible.

This would be an immediate policy for the people of the GDR; we in the West have no such prospect today, since we have lost our way in a maze of legal paragraphs. Taking a long view, however, it would also be a policy leading to reunification, for it pre-supposes a transformation within the Socialist Unity Party system. Humane action would in this case coincide with what is politically and tactically correct. Change would in the first instance improve things for people in the Eastern Zone – this would be humane; the political aspect would be that any change is bound to set off a whole chain of changes. In this way alone a certain element of elasticity could be introduced into the present situation; new facts and new variants would be introduced into the existing rigid relationships.

To avoid any misunderstanding, I am not arguing for the recognition of the GDR. We cannot express this recognition de jure so long as the

Socialist Unity Party system in Ulbricht's state permits no free, secret elections. Things might perhaps look different if the communists once won only 64 or 51 per cent of votes in an election, instead of the customary 99.95 per cent. Until then there can be no talk of legitimising the regime, of self-determination by the people or of recognising the GDR, either. But outside the limits of recognition much can be done to stabilise contacts between the two parts of Germany again — or at least to prevent them from dwindling.

We should be clear about a number of things in this connection.

1. Anybody who demands or helps a counterrevolution in the GDR blocks gradual evolution. The changes must of necessity be effected by those in charge of the regime. A western campaign for contacts must, therefore, on no account fail to include subordinate Socialist Unity Party functionaries.

2. The call to "remove the wall" will find a hearing only in a relatively late phase — when its removal and re-introduction of free movement in both directions can no longer result in a counter-revolution via the Berlin S-Bahn, i.e., when people will stay in the GDR even if it is possible to leave it.

3. Such self-control will only be possible for people in the GDR when the living standard there has reached an acceptable level and the Party feels that it is in indisputable control; it will not loosen the reins before the GDR is thoroughly stable, economically and politically. Recognition of this fact, of course, brings up the question as to how far we should be interested in such a stabilisation. If the path to liberalisation leads through stabilisation, then we should take part in it by means of credits and other assistance; these need not by any means be one-sided, but could very well be on a "give and take" basis with some return demanded in each phase. We should profit doubly, therefore, once from each concession made and again from the fact that our assistance would encourage more and more such concessions.

4. A policy in Bonn which would, through direct action, thin down the essence of communism in the GDR, would fit into the international scene, especially into the framework of US policy with regard to the eastern countries. It would not produce immediate results, but would in the long run promise greater possibilities of success than the present defensive attitude.

We need not fear to engage in an imaginative, elastic campaign for contacts. Everything is in our favour. The spirit of doubt is already at work in the GDR, the laws of trade will also tend towards a loosening-up. Time is on our side. What we need is more confidence; we should take a deeper breath.

Must Coexist in Peace

By Günter Kertzscher ("Neues Deutschland", East Berlin)

Theo Sommer spent some days taking a look at what is actually happening in the GDR. He sees German political problems in a far more realistic light than many politicians in Bonn, who have surrounded themselves with a whole system of fictions and can no longer distinguish between truth and imagination.

The first fact which he recognises is that the GDR exists and will continue to exist. The second fact is that "reunification" cannot be won by military means or bought by diplomatic means. The third fact is that we need a "sensible interim policy". Recognition of these facts provides a joint basis for further consideration. Our policy, too, is based upon the fact that two states with different social systems will exist in Germany side by side for some time to come and that a sensible interim policy is therefore necessary.

We thus agree in principle with the four conclusions reached by Theo Sommer at the end of his article, although his point of departure and his eventual aim are different. At all events, it is hopeless to indulge in counterrevolution in the GDR. There is no sense in demanding removal of the Berlin wall so long as the conditions necessary for this do not exist. It is better to encourage trade between the two German states than to block it. Rapprochement between the two German states fits in better with general tendencies in world politics than a continuation of the cold war.

So far we are basically in agreement. But what should a "sensible interim policy" look like? Theo Sommer calls for imagination, but he sets limits to his own. He suggests contacts, exchange of newspapers, credits, travel passes, visits. Good. But one limit is set when he writes: "I am not pleading for recognition of the GDR." This is not a logical conclusion from his premises, but a left-over which contradicts his premises.

If this sentence is merely a concession to Bonn conventions, we suggest that since Theo Sommer has shown some courage he should also find the courage to ignore this taboo. If this is not the case, we suggest that he thinks the matter through to its logical conclusion. So long as people in Bonn thought that they could deal with the GDR by means of a policy of strength, they did not want to prejudice the success of sudden action by previous recognition. Theo Sommer has seen that this is not a possible solution. Non-recognition has thus lost all meaning. The reason for non-recognition given by Theo Sommer cannot be taken seriously. It may not be possible for bourgeois democratic thinkers to understand the way in which socialist democracy functions, but it should be noted that the Federal Republic maintains diplomatic relations with at least a dozen countries whose political systems are quite definitely not bourgeois parliamentary systems.

Theo Sommer's ideas are also limited when he speaks of necessary changes in conditions. He speaks of a change in the GDR. There is no doubt that conditions are changing rapidly in the GDR. The technical revolution is taking place side-by-side with the socialist revolution in the GDR; production, socialist democracy and the people's ways of thinking are therefore developing steadily and our system is becoming more and more stable. This does in fact make it easier to improve relations between the two German states. Theo Sommer does not seem to have thought about changes in West Germany. But this is what is most urgently necessary.

We do not mean a change in the social system. It is not our business to get rid of capitalism in West Germany. We also know how to prevent anyone from meddling with socialism in the GDR. But we need a secure peace just as much as the West Germans. Two things are therefore essential if the deep gulf running through Germany is to be bridged.

First, the government of the Federal Republic must abandon its revanchist policy. Under revanchist policy we understand all efforts to change the present frontiers in or around Germany. So long as the frontiers are open to question there

can be no secure peace. Non-recognition of the GDR and its frontiers is also a sign of revanchism. If the West German government abandoned its revanchist policy it would no longer have any reason to refuse to negotiate with the GDR government. No understanding can be achieved without negotiations.

The other condition necessary if the division is to be overcome is renunciation of nuclear weapons by both German states. This also includes refusal to participate in a multi-lateral atomic striking force. On January 6th this year Walter Ulbricht suggested that the two German states conclude a treaty jointly renouncing nuclear weapons. In a letter to Ludwig Erhard on May 26th he suggested that the renunciation should be made in two independent statements, so that the question of recognition could present no obstacle.

These are the decisive conditions which will have to be fulfilled if normal relations in Germany are to be achieved. Many partial problems could then be easily solved – including the problem of movements across our state frontier, which is often brought up for propaganda purposes in this connection without regard for the situation as a whole. Of course, we continue to favour the idea of taking small steps first, such as an agreement on passes for West Berliners or on an exchange of newspapers. This could all lead to a confederation of German states, which would be the best possible interim solution.

We agree with Theo Sommer in wishing that capitalist West Germany would gather the confidence to enter into long-term peaceful competition with us. There is no need at this stage to enter into arguments about who is to determine the future of Germany. Time will reveal this. Countess Dönhoff, writing in the "Zeit" about her impressions of the GDR, said: "The most frightening thing for me was that at every step we were confronted by a totally different view of the world; this is what made the deepest impression upon me."

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Diplomacy in the Thaw

By George F. Kennan

(former US Ambassador in Moscow & Belgrade)

When it comes to the military factor, the bald fact is that the Western Powers, over a period that now runs back for several years, have committed themselves more and more deeply against anything in the nature of a military disengagement in Europe. Not only do they reject the possibility of any extensive withdrawal of foreign troops from the Western part of the Continent, even if this were to be by way of reciprocation for a similar withdrawal of Soviet forces, but they appear to have set their face, in present circumstances, against anything in the nature of a European pact or a non-aggression pact between the NATO and Warsaw Pact members. They are also averse to any sort of arrangement for the denuclearisation of the European area, even, again, if this were to be on a reciprocal basis.

Finally, they have exhibited no very convincing evidence of any disposition to place effective limits on the rearmament of Western Germany, where one restriction after the other, established in earlier years, has quietly gone by the board, and where the Germans are now, in the view of everybody in Eastern Europe, well on the way to becoming in all essential respects a full-fledged nuclear Power. Yet at the same time the Western Powers, with the exception of the French, have been unwilling to recognise the finality of Germany's eastern frontiers; and the West German Government, with the blessing of the others, still pursues a policy of total irreconcilability toward the East German State.

To the East European satellite leaders, faced with these attitudes, and noting the extreme rigidity with which they are adhered to by the Western Governments, anything like a relaxation of the military factor in East-West relations can only appear today as discouragingly remote. In present circumstances, they can hope neither for the removal of Soviet forces from those Eastern European positions which they now occupy, nor for any further East-West agreements that could take the heat off military tensions. Particularly discouraging and disturbing to them is the progressive rearmament of Western Germany against the background of a West German commitment to the liberation of Eastern Germany, even though that commitment professes to envisage only peaceful means.

The effect which the combination of these two things has had on the feelings of people in Eastern Europe cannot be emphasised too strongly. Either one without the other might have been less unacceptable.

A strong commitment to the reunification of Germany might have been tolerable if it had not been supported by a military policy designed to make Western Germany into one of the two strongest States in Western Europe.

Or a rearmament of Western Germany, while never fully defensible in East European eyes, might have been more tolerable if it had been coupled with a greater readiness on the part of West German political leaders to faire bonne mine a mauvais jeu, to accept the existence of a Communist Germany at least as a regrettable necessity of the present epoch, and to regard the cause of German unification less as a programmatical commitment and more as an historical inevitability, to be left to the healing hand of time.

But the spectre of the violent liberation of Eastern Germany, by means not resting on any agreement with the Russians, and coming either against the background of, or by means of, a revived German military ascendancy, unites both Governments and peoples in Eastern Europe in a common reaction of horror and apprehension.

("On Dealing with the Communist World," by George F. Kennan)

Harper & Row, New York, 1964

Another Hitler Man in West German Cabinet

West German Chancellor Erhard appointed another old Hitler supporter to a cabinet post on June 16th. Ludger Westrick, since 1951 State Secretary in the Ministry of Economics, was promoted to the post of Federal Minister without Portfolio.

Soon after the nazis came to power in 1933, Westrick, a successful businessman, was appointed by Goering as one of the members of the "Industrial Council for the Development of the Luftwaffe". During the war Hitler conferred on him the title of "War Economy Leader".

Westrick played a leading part in looting the industries of nazi-occupied south-eastern Europe and integrating them in the nazi war machine. He wrote in the business newspaper "Der Deutsche Volkswirt" on November 31st 1941: "As long as the trumpets of war blow, the German light metal industry has only one aim: Germany's final victory".

BERLIN NOTEBOOK

By John Peet

For a number of years, many people in all parts of the world have been watching the development and growth of the West German Bundeswehr, the successor of the Wehrmacht, with a certain amount of suspicion.

They have pointed out that this army is exclusively led by men who held top ranks in Hitler's armed forces, and that it is being trained in the old aggressive Prussian militarist spirit. They have been particularly alarmed by the fact that plans have for long been afoot to provide this new Wehrmacht with nuclear weapons.

Uniformed Citizens

Bonn spokesmen have disdainfully rejected any criticisms. "This is quite a new style of armed force, composed of citizens in uniform", they have claimed. "All leading officers have been screened by a special committee of Parliament to make sure that they are today convinced democrats, whatever they may have been in the past, and in addition Parliament has appointed a special independent civil commissioner, to see to it that the Bundeswehr is truly democratic."

GERMAN REPORT has dealt in the past with the activities of the "screening commission" which was supposed to stop incriminated nazis from getting command posts in the new West German army; it must have been one of the most tolerant commissions on record, since it happily accepted for service without a qualm men like General Friedrich Foertsch who had actually served long sentences for war crimes. It would be wearisome to list all the other old Hitler generals who received the stamp of approval from this commission.

The parliamentary screening commission gave the old militarists no trouble, and they certainly expected no trouble from the man who has held, since 1961, the post of "civil commissioner for the armed forces". This man is Helmuth Heye, formerly an admiral in Hitler's navy, and on his record a dyed-in-the-wool militarist and reactionary.

Let me just give you a few details from Admiral Heye's record to show what I mean. He volunteered for the Kaiser's navy at the beginning of World War One, and won decorations as a U-boat officer. Immediately after the Kaiser's war ended, Heye served in one of the proto-fascist "Free Corps" in the Baltic states; in the Second World War he commanded nazi commando units and one-man-submarine squads.

After the Second World War he served in various civilian capacities, and as a Christian Democratic member of the West German Parliament in building up the West German armed forces.

In 1961, he was given the job of parliamentary commissioner, in which his main job was to submit soothing annual reports saying that everything was fine in the army, navy and airforce.

But then, in the middle of June this year, came the bombshell. Admiral Heye, for reasons hitherto unexplained, apparently took his duties seriously, and made a public statement that the Bundeswehr was rapidly becoming "the sort of army that we did not want", and an army "equipped with the weapons of tomorrow but trained in the spirit of yesterday".

Outburst

Immediately Admiral Heye's statement was published, the West German Establishment burst forth like a volcano with a flood of accusations that the parliamentary commissioner was exceeding his duties, that he was sabotaging the "defence of the free western world" and so on. At the time when this issue of GERMAN REPORT went to press nobody had yet accused the old admiral of being a "red agent" or of mental instability, but such charges can be expected at any time.

I should like to make it clear that Admiral Heye is quite obviously not an opponent of West German remilitarisation; his aim is clearly to make the Bundeswehr a more efficient fighting force; but just because his criticisms come from such a man, with such a background, I think some of them are worthy of record. In an interview with the West German weekly "Quick" on June 21st, Admiral Heye said:

"A few days ago, I submitted my annual report to Parliament, but I do not have the right to address Parliament on this report. For that reason I am taking advantage of my rights and my duties as a citizen to comment on what I regard as dangerous developments in the Bundeswehr.

"Two-and-a-half years ago I took over the job of parliamentary civil commissioner. That means I was charged by Parliament with the task of seeing to it that individual rights were not encroached upon in the Bundeswehr, that they were not sacrificed on the altar of military discipline. I was also charged with the task of seeing to it that 'citizens in uniform' should be first of all citizens, and not simply ciphers in uniform.

"Make a Break"

"Logically the idea of 'citizens in uniform' can only be put into practice if we make a break, and do not continue where we left off at the end of the Second World War. We are living in a new age with new modes of life, and the conceptions of soldierliness must be adapted to this new age.

"When I took over the task of civil commissioner I was convinced that I would be able to influence developments in this direction. This turned out to be wishful thinking. It is sad, but it must be said: If we do not change course completely, the Bundeswehr will develop into the sort of army that we did not want. There is an unmistakable trend for the Bundeswehr to become a state in a state, a law to itself. In the Bundeswehr no notice is taken of the changes in society. The Bundeswehr believes that it can get along without changing its style. This is threatening, this is dangerous."

Admiral Heye then gave a number of examples of the way in which the office of civil commissioner, intended to provide parliamentary control of the armed forces, was being ignored by the officer's corps.

"Responsible politicians and military leaders wish to down-grade the civil commissioner to the rank of a 'complaint centre'; others wish to abolish the office entirely.

"Unfortunately the Bundeswehr is still educated and drilled in an old-fashioned way." The admiral gave a number of examples, ranging from physical violence through inhuman drill methods, to obscenity on the part of officers.

"Our army is equipped with the weapons of tomorrow, but trained in the spirit of yesterday" said Admiral Heye, and concluded: "The Bundeswehr is taking a dangerous path. It must turn back. Will this be possible — or shall we lose the future?"

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